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THE RETURN OF THE CHRIST
If the historical report written by Gregory of Tours (538 – 594) is 
to be believed, the re-apparitions of Christ began approximately six 
centuries after his famous crucifixion. One among many was report-
ed to have happened around the year 591, when the man who lived 
near Bourges, found himself surrounded by a swarm of flies while he 
was cutting logs in the deep woods. In the light of this unpleasant 
incident he was said to have experienced a divine revelation: he grew 
certain that the flies were, in fact, the harbingers of the End and that 
he himself was the One who had come to Earth for the second time 
in the moment of its deliverance. This ambush of flies pushed him to 
the verge of madness for two whole years, after which, as reported 
by Tours, he publicly proclaimed himself as Jesus Christ and began 
his prophetic campaign, accompanied by a woman “who passed as his 
sister”1, naming her Mary. The campaign eventually escalated to the 
point, when he marched upon Le-Puy-en-Velay with more than three 
thousand followers and, instead of his host, sent forward a line of com-
pletely naked and dancing messengers “who announced his Coming”2 
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to the amazed bishop. If this gesture by the self-proclaimed Christ 
from the 6th century could seem a bit odd, Aurilius, then bishop of 
Le Puy, knew exactly how to answer to “Christ’s” dancing message. 
According to Tours, the bishop’s men disposed of “that Christ who 
ought rather to be named anti Christ”3 and pronounced the impostor 
as a false prophet immediately after his violent death. 
In his work Historiae, also known as History of Franks, Gregory of 
Tours describes apparitions of three different “prophets” in his time. 
Besides the Christ from Bourges, Tours also writes of Desiderius of 
Tours, a suspiciously abstemious healer, who supposedly liked to vig-
orously stretch limbs of “paralytics and other cripples”4 to the point 
where the unfortunate had to be carried away “half-dead”5 or had, in 
some cases, even died. Eventually, he was found guilty of fraud and 
cast out of the city’s territory6. Tours also includes the report of the 
foul-mouthed “prophet”, whom he had a chance to meet in person 
and who was later found to be a run-away slave who carried with him 
a bag full of “roots, moles’ teeth, the bones of mice, the claws and fat 
of bears”7. After attending the holy processions in Paris accompanied 
by a band of prostitutes, he was thrown into custody, released and 
then thrown in again, but soon broke out of prison and arrived highly 
intoxicated to the church of Saint-Julien-le-Pauvre, where he passed 
out on the pavement and with his bodily odour – “stench that sur-
passed the stenches of all sewers and privies”8 – prevented Gregory of 
Tours himself from entering the church. 
For the latter there was no doubt – all the prophets turned out 
to be common con-men; however, although the potential reader of 
the Historiae might think that the story of the deceivers is ultimately 
brought to its end with their exposure, their appearance connects to 
a much wider problem of the Middle Ages that can be analysed pre-
cisely through an occurrence of the deceit as such. Gregory of Tours 
was aware of this problem, which is clear from his direct referral in the 
ninth book of Historiae to the teachings of Bible, according to which 
the coming of “false Christs” and “false prophets” will announce the 
beginning of the all-worldly End. With this gesture Tours isolated a 
key sign among the multitude of apocalyptic signs, which apparently 
had the tendency to appear vastly in his time and which by no means 
were something that was to be ignored by medieval observers like him. 
If we follow the biblical narrative with a similar enthusiasm that 
is so typical for the Middle Ages, we find that the principal event an-
nouncing the End is not the Second Coming of Christ, but the arrival 
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of someone who is supposed to falsely pass himself as the true Messiah. 
The main role in this epochal scheme of things was therefore ascribed 
to the fraudster – the deceiver who, as the herald of the End, threat-
ened the very dispositif of the medieval world, (the world which es-
sentially constituted itself through the anticipation of its own end) 
but at the same time appeared also to be the main internode – the only 
one that can fulfil and lead the world to its desperately anticipated 
resolution. It seems more and more justifiable to argue that the final-
ization of the eschatological scenario is essentially conditioned by the 
deceit of the most notorious biblical figure. The great Antichrist must 
come – before, and if the world is to end. 
ALL THE FALSE PROPHETS
Although it is known that Gregory of Tours was not strongly inclined 
towards the eschatological calculations of timei, it is hard to miss the 
apocalyptic tone of his report on the false Christ from Bourges. Nev-
ertheless, in the very beginning of the report, before the false Christ of 
Bourges gets even mentioned, Tours lists the nuisances that pestered 
the French territory at the time: plague in Marseille, great famine in 
Angers, Nantes and Le Mans9. Tours also mentions the earthquake, 
peculiar natural phenomena (“balls of fire […] speeding across the 
sky”10 sun eclipse, heavy rains) and the lethality of the bubonic plague 
in Viviers and Avignon (Ibid.). Doing so, Tours actualizes famous 
prophecies of the synoptic gospels in his time and place: “There will 
be great earthquakes, famines and pestilences in various places, and 
fearful events and great signs from heaven.” 11. 
With the focus shifting to the figure of the false prophet, who’s 
arrival was supposedly to follow these catastrophic accounts, Tours 
transfers the context of the End even further, to someone who was 
perceived to be the key biblical figure of the End: “Christ who ought 
rather to be named anti-Christ”. The fraudster, who for Tours comes 
across not as who he claims to be, but rather as a dangerous «anti-the-
sis» of Christ – The Antichrist, whose arrival was perceived to be 
the most threatening among all of the anticipated apocalyptic signs. 
However, we must already at this point, propose a question of wheth-
i A very widespread medieval practice of calculating the imminent arrival 
of the end of the world, based on the idea that the end will come exactly when 
the world reaches the age of 6000 years, and will be announced by certain 
signs of the end.
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er this old narrative, reflecting in Tour’s words, thinks the Antichrist 
as the antithesis of Christ, or rather, perceives both figures as being 
somewhat akin. The latter preposition might turn out to be even more 
dangerous than the former.
Tours’ statement implies the connection between the two. The 
Second Coming of Christ presented was supposed to be preceded 
by the Coming of Christ’s imitator – and the latter was prophesied 
to be very successful in his pretence. Although the Christ’s Parousia 
was supposed to belong to him and him alone, it was prophesied to 
be usurped by an imposter who, according to the biblical narrative, 
would arrive sooner than Christ. The Christ’s absence would conse-
quently be the condition that would enable the Antichrist to success-
fully snatch the unoccupied role.ii Thus, the Coming of the Antichrist 
is presented through this narrative as a rather perplexing riddle, since 
the Antichrist is to pretend to be someone whose arrival would indu-
bitably not go unnoticed, but who would surely be very warmly wel-
comed and hardly expected by Christ’s followers. Christ, after all, was 
deemed to lead his people into eternal salvation. And it is precisely 
here where the entire dilemma of that easily deceived follower, name-
ly, the one who is to recognize Him, arises. 
In fact, the recognizing subject has no other choice than to put 
himself to work in this recognizing process, albeit at equal risk of An-
tichrist’s deceit and Christ’s rage, if a mistake is to be made, since only 
one of them is the true Christ. The eternal salvation of his soul dangles 
on a thread. 
Nevertheless, Christ’s followers have been warned by Christ 
himself. They must follow the true Christ if they want to reach their 
salvation, while to follow anyone else would be blasphemous and ru-
inous for them. However, there were no instructions left for them to 
navigate through this, seeming impossible identifying process – how 
were they to recognize the true Christ if he had truly returned? There 
was a very strong probability that they would become victims of the 
Antichrist’s deceit. Christ warned his disciples about the meaning of 
the mass appearance of pseudo-Christs and pseudo-prophets, when they 
pleaded him to disclose the signs of his Coming and the End that 
would follow: 
ii The Antichrist and Christ are also terminologically connected – parousia 
in the New Testament, carries a meaning of Arrival meaning separate 
emergence of both figures in this specific context (2 Thess 2:9).
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See to it that no one deceives you. For many will come in My 
name, claiming, ‘I am the Christ,’ and will deceive many.12 At 
that time if anyone says to you, ‘Look, here is the Messiah!’ or, 
‘There he is!’ do not believe it. For false messiahs and false prophets 
will appear and perform great signs and wonders to deceive, if pos-
sible, even the elect. See, I have told you ahead of time. “So if 
anyone tells you, ‘There he is, out in the wilderness,’ do not go 
out; or, ‘Here he is, in the inner rooms,’ do not believe it.13
We can notice that the imposters that Christ describes, are not bear-
ing any recognizable signs and that only their true nature is deceitful 
but not necessarily their potential appearance– the fact that rather 
perplexed some medieval readers. Yet, there are some key moments in 
Christ’s words that ought to be emphasized: apparently, someone will 
come, who will try to deceive the followers; he will claim to be the Christ 
himself, perform “great signs and wonders”, even the same ones that 
the true Christ had once, in order to make them believe him to be 
Christ; and he will succeed at deceiving “even the elect”. Christ warns 
them in advance, and announces that he will return also, but only af-
ter being preceded by a multitude of pseudo-Christs who will use his 
name with pretence and falsely pose as him.  
The predicament of successfully recognizing the false prophets 
presents itself as the problem of distinguishing between what is true 
and what is deceitful. Many eschatological interpreters, including Tours, 
had to confront it. However, by itself, this problem connects to a much 
wider and renowned philosophical intricacy of the “truth” and the “ap-
pearance”. Why an attempt to address the relationship of “true” and 
“deceitful” instead of “true” and “false”? Can “deceitfulness” or better, 
“trickery”, work any differently than a lie? Or can it be seen, at best, only 
as a certain variant of falsity? Why leave behind the traditional pair of 
“Truth” and “Lie” that is so often to be thought together and the with-
drawal from which might seem, at least at first, too hasty? Is it possible to 
argue, that Trickery – with its specific form of deceit – does not really fall 
into the order of a Lie, but possesses its own logic that perhaps should be 
thought independently? We will argue why we must do just that.
TRICK OR LIE
In the Biblical context, these two terms are merged entirely, giving 
the appearance that their reciprocal differentiation is not (yet) estab-
lished. The Antichrist is essentially depicted as a Liar14, as the one who 
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employs deceit15 in order to institute himself as Christ and refutes the 
existing God by self-apotheosis16. He is therefore “a liar”, since he ap-
propriates the identity of someone else, whilst simultaneously being a 
Denier of the World Order, to which he threatens with modification, 
so that he could occupy the coveted place which does otherwise not 
belong to him by provenance. 
The issue is, above all, that a certain place, albeit an ephemeral 
place in the entrenched God’s order, is already reserved for him. And 
that is the place of “trickery”, or if you wish, for the time being, a 
“lie” – which is nothing else but a vacant place of the other: if John 
states in the First Epistle that no lie can stem from the truth, meaning 
that the Antichrist’s deceitfulness cannot surpass Christ’s truthfulness, 
when the latter is revealed, it largely does not exclude the notion that 
truth could emanate from a lie. After all, the deception itself seems a 
necessary condition for the emergence of the Truth – it must precede 
it in order to be affirmed as such. Christ’s descent from the sky has, as 
it seems, its own condition: the Parousia of his personal doppelgänger 
and the latter’s failed attempt of establishing the lie as the truth. With 
its clepto-parousia, to borrow Aleš Bunta’s neologism from another 
context17, the Antichrist steals someone else’s Parousia by deceiving 
Christ’s followers, as though his arrival is in fact the Second Messianic 
Coming, thus seizing Christ’s place, which apparently remained emp-
ty. This holy deceit triggers the true Christ’s Second Coming, which 
automatically annihilates the imitator, and this event then onsets the 
affirmation of the truth that sprung out of the deceit.
By tracing these fundamental features of the Antichrist, it be-
comes evident that as such he is not a lying, but a deceitful figure of 
the biblical narrative, since he, as the Grand Deceiver, in contrast to a 
Liar, is wholly constituted through his identity-relation with Christ. 
With the theft of Christ’ identity Antichrist manages to secure the 
position however, he accomplishes that through his immense likeness 
to the substituted, and therefore usurps with his sameness, not other-
ness, which is what the prototypical liar would do. The liar’s function 
would be to distort the truth, not duplicate it, which Antichrist spon-
taneously manages to achieve. The conniver’s deceit possesses an ut-
terly different structure than a liar’s lie. The lie tends to morph the 
truth into something else, while the Trickster at work, gets completely 
engrossed into the mechanism of Trickery. Not only does he not per-
form his deceit arbitrarily, but as we will show, he manages to obliviate 
himself as a deceiver in his constitutive moment of becoming.
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DOSTOEVSKY’S SCENARIO
That Christ’s arrival is evidently problematic we have already dis-
cerned. But what would happen if Christ had materialized without his 
deceitful predecessor? We encounter such a situation in Dostoevsky’s 
The Grand Inquisitor, a poem by Ivan Karamazov, in which Christ after 
centuries of quietude, begins to glance upon his followers and then 
out of mercy and his love for them, decides to reappear, however 
“this is not, of course, that coming in which He will appear, ac-
cording to His promise, at the end of days in the clouds of heaven 
with power and great glory and which will take place suddenly, 
"as the lightning cometh out of the east, and shineth even unto 
the west". No, He has conceived the desire to visit his children at 
least for an instant”18 
As the site of his emergence, he chooses Seville in the middle of 
16th-century. He heads towards the territory of the Spanish inquisi-
tion, one morning after they have burned on the bonfires ad maiorem 
Dei gloriam a hundred heretics in his name. As he walks along the 
scorching streets, he is instantly recognized. People flock towards him 
and he “passes among them with a quiet smile of infinite compas-
sion”19, yet remains silent. Incidentally, he cures a blind man from the 
gathered crowd, so that he may gaze at him, and revives a girl who has 
just been taken to her burial. The Grand Inquisitor witnesses these 
events transpiring around him but decides to incarcerate Christ with-
out a moment’s hesitation. He then pays Christ a visit in his cell at 
night and condemns him to death after a prolonged monologue – not 
as a heretic, but as the disturber of the established order:
I tell you again: tomorrow you will see that obedient flock, which 
at the first nod of my head will rush to rake up the hot embers 
to the bonfire on which I am going to burn you for having come 
to get in our way. For if there ever was one who deserved our 
bonfire more than anyone else, it is you. Tomorrow I am going 
to burn you. Dixi.’”20
Christ’s fate is therefore repeated. Mere moments after his return 
to the world, he is thrown into a cell and sentenced to death. While 
He remains silent, the Grand Inquisitor speaks. Not only does he 
speak, his final word inaugurates the might of the Word he is holding. 
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Dixi [I spoke] is the final-word, spoken by the highest authority21 – 
permitting no objection. The context is marvellously enhanced by Al-
yosha’s incomprehension of Christ’s silence: 
He says nothing either? Gazes at him, but says no word?22 His 
brother Ivan responds by explaining that the Grand Inquisitor 
remarks to Christ that “[even] He has not the right to add any-
thing to what has already been said by Him in former times.23
 The act of adding or supplementing would cause a certain modification 
of the already-spoken, and consequently, its substitution. The one who 
possesses the Word holds the power. According to Karamazov, the 
Word was passed down from God to those who, in His absence, can 
exercise authority on His behalf. The re-emergence, and that before 
the Judgment Day, undermines his own power.
According to Dostoevsky’s “scenario”, Christ with his arrival, 
before the Antichrist’s deceit ever ensues or he materialises, violates 
the rules of the game and He is hence compelled to assume the role of 
the undesirable prophet who needs to be eliminated for the preserva-
tion of the world order. Christ’s silence is thus explained – the Word 
must be constrained until the Antichrist’s Coming, since nothing can 
be added to the already written text.
The medieval world of Tours and the Grand Inquisitor is a world 
that completely absorbs the biblical transferral of the world – a world, 
in which God is “the logos, the truth that speaks and hears itself 
speak”24iii, which directly connects to Foucault’s understanding of the 
episteme of the Middle Ages, where “writing is part of the fabric of 
the world”25 and marked by “the profound kinship of language with 
the world”26. The Antichrist as the anti-messiah is not simply the One 
who would oppose the Word, but someone who would try to seize it 
for its own. He is a figure whose sly speech obtrudes upon the Truth; 
a “word that pretends to be the truth when it is not”27, if we follow 
iii Here Derrida refers precisely to that medieval interpretation of the world 
as a text that can be read: “Nature, Gods’ Book, appeared to the medieval mind 
to be a written form consonant with divine thought and speech” (Derrida, 
2004: 33, whilst Foucault invokes “the prose of the world” as the concept of 
16th-century episteme, by which the mystery of the world persists as a text 
that needs to be learned how to be read: “The process is everywhere the 
same: that of the sign and its likeness, and this is why nature and the word can 
intertwine with one another to infinity, forming, for those who can read it, one 
vast single text.” (Foucault 1989: 38)
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Origen’s interpretation of the Antichrist. Desiring the Word, he is an-
nulling it unknowingly and with his own existence: as a word that 
tries to profess itself as the Word.
The deceiver’s formation through speech is analogous to the 
structure of “Rousseauesque” Writing, as coined by Derrida (name-
ly, being a supplement of the speech). In this regard Antichrist adds 
itself as a supplement to Christ who, being the Word, speaks itself. An-
tichrist adds to the Word as an image or representation of its speech, 
as “the addition of a technique, a sort of artificial and artful ruse to 
make speech present when it is actually absent28. He inflicts a certain 
violence upon the Word and turns dangerous in the moment when, as a 
representation, he commences the pretence of being the presence itself. 
He functions on the principle of transcription – as a pseudo-Christ he 
transcribes Christ and then, by a certain inherent necessity constituting 
him as a substitute, “forgets” about his function of supplementation, 
thus begins purporting as the fullest measure of presence. 
He contrives his ancestry and begins operating from the vacant 
place left behind by the original. By resorting to mimicry, he attempts 
to eliminate the difference, which separates him as an imitator from 
what he is copying, as if the concealment could enable him the cross-
ing into the original form. In the mimetic relation with the absent 
Christ, Antichrist adds to Christ’s absence. He intervenes as a supple-
ment, imposes himself on Christ’s place in the latter’s absence and “if 
it fills, it is as if one fills a void”29. Hence, he appears as “an illusion 
that side-tracks us”30, since he is, through the workings of trickery, 
successful in obscuring the fact that he cannot as intrinsically empty 
replace the original or add himself to him without a failure.
Since the Trickster is seizing the place of the one and only Truth, 
he cannot be anything but a lie (to preudos), a deceit. Christ manages 
to retain his position in such a way that at the very instant when the 
Antichrist’s deceit is revealed, and precisely because of this deceit, he 
gets reaffirmed in the world as the latter’s End. With the splendour of 
his Coming, Christ is supposed to “overthrow him with the breath of his 
mouth”31. With the Word, speaking the Truth, Christ announces his 
identity and causes Antichrist’s immediate downfall. His battle with 
his failed double, who never completely manages to form as such and 
who can be recognized and thus revealed only by Him, the original, 
befalls in the field of speech. We can read about it, about the last event 
in Revelation:
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I saw heaven standing open and there before me was a white 
horse, whose rider is called Faithful and True. With justice he 
judges and wages war. His eyes are like blazing fire, and on his 
head are many crowns. He has a name written on him that no one 
knows but he himself. He is dressed in a robe dipped in blood, 
and his name is the Word of God.32
Christ’s name remains veiled until it is ultimately announced by  One 
who truly carries it, since He himself is that spoken and heard, the true 
Word of God. When the latter, at the end of time, finally speaks itself, 
Truth springs into existence and the Trickster collapses. As such he 
can no longer endure, considering he has directly bound his identity 
(as an imitator) to the imitated object. His failed attempt at establish-
ing himself as the Truth signals that the Antichrist, as a False Christ, 
possesses essentially a structure of trickery that prompts his formation 
as a Trickster when stuck in a vacant place – a place, which is indefinite-
ly and immovably occupied, because it already belongs to someone 
else, even if this someone, or better, something, is in fact the absence of 
the original.
Antichrist’s most prominent feature is precisely his trickery – 
that he will impersonate Christ, and will do so successfully, and that 
his impressionist ability will soar. It seems that the only one who can 
penetrate through his guise is the real Christ – the one who knows 
for certain, who is the true Christ and knows that he is dealing with 
an imposter. Even more, with someone who has embraced the same 
intention, namely, to ascend to the Kingdom of Heaven and re-ap-
propriate as God in the new forthcoming order. The Antichrist’s in-
duction as a deceiving figure in the eschatological scenario is indeed 
triumphant, yet only partially – he can remain on the place that was 
reserved for him in advance but is concurrently inhabited by the ab-
sence of another. 
During the moment of usurpation of this vacant place his final 
transgression into positivity is blocked, which projects in the estab-
lished order as an attempt of forbidden duplication – nevertheless, the 
position of the original is singular, and the Antichrist is not allowed to 
duplicate the Holy Trinity. Thus, the Trickster stands numbed in the 
place of the trickery, where he was put by God himself, when he allo-
cated him a role in the grand scheme, as on a chessboard, to act as the 
main condition of Christ’s Parousia. He cannot step any further than 
this; he is instantaneously broken in his attempt. Same as Tours’ pawn 
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from Bourges, he is not aware that his movements are constrained, 
and that he is not permitted to step across to the king’s position or 
to employ his own presence to transfigure the king, in order for the 
real to become his – mostly because he never manages to possess the 
presence as suchiv.
It all points to the notion that Antichrist as the imitator nec-
essarily exhausts himself in adapting to what he imitates. He fails in 
his doing due to some particular necessity, for which the irreparable 
chasm is seemingly responsible, since it embeds between him and the 
copied original object – the similarity that intervenes as a foundation 
of difference and is duplicating the original with a difference, which 
cannot be sustained by the place of the deceiver’s usurpation. This 
place, which is a place of the original’s absence and simultaneously the im-
possible (un-reachable) place of the deceiver, is in truth the only place of 
the deceiver’s apparition where the latter emerges as negative in all of 
his occurrence. Negative in the sense, that he is rather predominantly 
being as non-existent – existentially coupled together with the imitat-
ed object, but otherwise completely tenuous, practically originarilyv 
erased, since he is, which is essential, self-obliviated at the very point of 
his constitutive moment.
The Trickster is thus not something that would gravitate towards 
replacing the original object, as is the initial impression, but rather 
something that duplicates it through its imitation. Hence, we are con-
fronted by two identical agents at a given moment – the copy and the 
original – between whom is no “positive”, qualitative or, in a certain 
sense, even topological difference, thus making it futile to discuss sub-
stitution in the ordinary sense of the word as this would inherently 
imply a certain otherness of the substitute in relation to the substituted. 
For the very logic of substitution, a different kind of imitator’s other-
ness would be required, which is not manifested here at the level of the 
logic of Trickery, which never enters the game directly, even though 
iv  We can read about something similar in one of Hildegarde von Bingen’s 
(1098–1179) most famous visions, which in a stream of medieval mystic 
interpretation of the Holy Bible confirm the failed Antichrist’s attempt of 
usurping Christ’s spot in the process of illicit duplication. In her vision the 
deceiver is cast down from the sky in the moment when he tries to climb onto 
it: “[...] and it raised itself up upon the mountain and tried to ascend the height 
of Heavens. And behold, there came suddenly a lightning bolt, which struck 
that head with such great force that it fell off the mountain and yielded up its 
spirit in death.” (Bingen 1990: 493).
v  By its origin.
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the Trickster gets automatically plunged into the difference when con-
fronting the original.
We can locate two causes of the Trickster’s failure. The first is 
conditioned by the empty place of the original, which the Trickster 
has (in a very narrowed sense) occupied, but has not taken a hold of in 
its entirety, since the original’s place refuses to be (and cannot be) ful-
filled by him and therefore, as long as it remains bound to the original, 
stays empty and does not yield to the Trickster, since he, being himself 
“void”, can neither fill nor seize it. As a deceiver, he is trapped in the 
aimless wandering on this same one-and-only place, which continues 
to be perennially empty and resists his advancements. At the time of 
Trickster’s formation as such, it is empty because it is stripped of the 
Original and marked by its absence and simultaneously due to be-
ing pursued and invaded by something without independent essence 
– something that adds as a mere “negativity”. The second cause of 
the deceiver’s demise is constituted by the very nature of trickery that 
rejects being kept in a concealed state of deception and strives towards 
self-disclosure, revealing the Trickster and consequently bringing him 
to his destructionvi.
THE PORTRAIT AND THE NAME
A mechanism, similar to the deceptive mechanism of Trickery, can 
be found in Freud’s descriptions of the mechanism of forgetfulness, or 
more specifically, in Freud’s accounts of the famous conversation he 
held with his traveling companion on the train that took him from 
Dubrovnik to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1889. First, in a letter to 
his friend Fließ33, a little later in the paper On psychical mechanism of 
forgetfulness (same year) and finally, in Psychopathology of Everyday Life 
(1901), Freud describes a curious phenomenon of forgetting a par-
ticular name. He emphasizes that this was not an occurrence of ordi-
nary forgetfulness, since almost simultaneously as the proper name 
flew into oblivion, the substitutive names started to obtrude instead. 
Freud realized he himself produced them in his pursuit of «the hidden 
name». However, the latter, no matter how hard he tried, “remained 
obstinately in hiding”34.  His great inner torment was resolved only 
vi The disclosure is viewed as a condition for establishing deception as 
the deception, but also as that which causes its elimination. The End induced 
by a disclosure of the deceit, is thus the affirmation of its inherent logic as 
well.
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a few days after when, as he himself writes, a «cultivated Italian»35 
finally released him by telling him the name he struggled to recall. 
Immediately after, Freud writes, “I was myself able to add the artist’s 
first name, Luca.”36 
According to Freud, this incident of forgetfulness was not coinci-
dental – a specific and not so rare mechanism was at work. In The Psy-
chic Mechanism of Forgetfulness we can find his most detailed description 
of this famous occurrence: 
A little later, our conversation turned to the subject of Italy and 
of pictures, and I had occasion to recommend my companion 
strongly to visit Orvieto some time, in order to see the frescoes 
there of the end of the world and the Last Judgement, with which 
one of the chapels in the cathedral had been decorated by a great 
artist. But the artist’s name escaped me, and I could not recall it. 
I exerted my powers of recollection, made all the details of the 
day I spent in Orvieto pass before my memory and convinced 
myself that not the smallest part of it had been obliterated or 
become indistinct. On the contrary, I was able to conjure up the 
pictures with greater sensory vividness than is usual with me. I 
saw before my eyes with especial sharpness the artist’s self-por-
trait - with a serious face and folded hands - which he has put in 
a corner of one of the pictures, next to the portrait of his prede-
cessor in the work, Fra Angelico da Fiesole; but the artist’s name, 
ordinarily so familiar to me, remained obstinately in hiding, nor 
could my travelling companion help me out37.
The name that disappeared from Freud’s memory was the name of 
the famous Italian Renaissance painter Luca Signorelli (1445 – 1523). 
But what, according to Freud, separates the Signorelli’s case from the 
“ordinary case” of forgetfulness, is that it is composed by “…not only 
forgetfulness, but also false recollection”38. 
In all the effort that is put into remembering the proper name, 
not only does it not have a tendency to appear on command, but, 
quite on the contrary, the substitutive names make persistent attempts 
to usurp its place (hence, the famous displacement from Signorelli to 
Botticelli and Boltraffio occurs). Ergo, this is not only a name finding 
problem, but also a problem of persistent production of substitutive 
names. Their act of substituting leads to inevitable failure, as they are 
immediately (at their very outset) noticed by their producer. The one 
24
who is producing them realizes their falsity in the very moment of 
their generation. However, this recognition does not halt the pro-
ductive process – instead, it accelerates it and doing so, confines it to 
self-repetitiveness.
The shift, caused by the faulty remembrance of the proper name, 
enables the appearance of substitutes. Thus, substitutes of the proper 
name continue to generate themselves tirelessly right until – when 
through the process of the subject’s recognition of the intruded as 
false and his consequential refusal of it – they return, and the cycle 
repeats itself all over again. The name cannot be recovered through 
repetitive production of substitutes, as substitutes always lead their 
producer back to themselves and never to the hidden name.
It seems that those substitutes in their multiplication, although 
being produced dependently from their producer enter a completely 
self-governing process, over which the producer has no control. The 
producer in this regard becomes the «observer», as it appears that he 
might be merely passively observing the production of a process over 
which he holds no productive power. As the process is overpowering, 
he gets deduced to the mere function of a tool, and the process begins 
to produce itself through and over him. 
Freud’s states that in the Signorelli case, he unintentionally for-
got »something« when he really wanted to forget »something else«. 
However, this was:
…not the name of the master of Orvieto; but this other brought 
about an associative connection between itself and this name, 
so that my act of volition missed the aim, and I forgot the one 
against my will, while I intentionally wished to forget the other.39
We can see, that the »other«, although it gets restrained, has no ten-
dency to vanish completely, but keeps returning. It obtrudes with the 
substitutes of the »one« that has been displaced. These substitutes, 
which wish to take the place of the one and only proper name, get gen-
erated through the producer’s associations – they are inherently con-
nected to the hidden name and the latter is desperately searching for 
itself in the process of the producer’s remembrance. Thus, these sub-
stitutes are not foreign to the hidden name but attempt to substitute 
with similarity. They deceive with their resemblance to the lost origi-
nal. The mechanism of Trickery causes the »other« to seize the orig-
inal in an attempt to usurp the place of a proper name and replace it 
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with a substitute similar to the forgotten »one«. However, the process 
of substitution clearly fails and never gets completed, as the producer 
keeps refusing the obtruding replacement for the hidden, immediately 
recognising it as false. 
Anecdotally, there exists another parallel with trickery that runs 
alongside the Signorelli’s parapraxis. This particular fresco from Orvi-
eto that Freud so thoroughly describes, is none other than the famous 
Signorelli’s depiction of the Antichrist from approximately 1501, titled 
Sermon and Deeds of the Antichrist. A self-portrait of the artist, located 
in the lower-left corner of the fresco suggests that this must surely be 
the image Freud had in mind when trying to remember Signorelli’s 
name, as Signorelli depicted himself in the corner of only one fresco 
that decorates the chapel San Brixio in Orvieto – and the main figure 
is precisely the Antichrist. 
This is the most famous portrait of the Antichrist from this pe-
riod, if not the most famous one of all – the Trickster occupies the 
central position in the artwork and all of the surrounding events align 
with him. Signorelli’s fresco depicts Antichrist’s rise, life and ensuing 
fall, while he stands erect on a white pedestal preaching to the de-
ceived followers, whom he misled and consequently doomed for all 
eternity. The devil rises behind, keeping close and blending almost 
into his torso. He is easily identifiable by horns burgeoning from his 
head, while he whispers into Antichrist’s left ear and reaches for his 
arm, as if guiding his gestures. 
When glancing over the Antichrist’s face and posture, it is dif-
ficult to overlook that Signorelli painted him entirely on a model of 
Christ. If we did not see the strange, glassy sort of gleam in his eyes, 
and if the devil standing right behind him would not be so eye-catch-
ing, we would believe that we are, in fact, looking at the portrait of 
Christ and not of his imitator, as it retains a characteristic Renais-
sance’s face of Christ, his long hair, an expression, a creased robe and 
nevertheless, the posture. Taking all this into the account, Signorelli 
clearly intended to portray the crookedness of the Antichrist – not of 
his features, that would make him recognizable for the viewer, but his 
deceptive character that would make him, by definition, completely 
unrecognizable. Signorelli’s portrait of the Antichrist is a portrait of 
an impostor who is posing as someone else without really possessing 
any other trait that would expose him as a deceiver. 
In this process of one usurping the place of another through 
similarity, the relationship between Christ and Antichrist resembles 
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the usurpation of proper names by substitutive names through asso-
ciation. It’s possible to observe an analogous, mimetic and substitut-
ing logic in both mechanisms - in mechanism of forgetfulness and in 
mechanism of trickery. Although the Antichrist strives to usurp the 
Christ’s place and substitute him, he performs an illegitimate dupli-
cation which cannot stand and is therefore, before it gets properly re-
alized, recognized as false (in the order of things) and eliminated by 
the proper subject.  
THE ORIGINARY OBLIVION
One might spontaneously assert that the most recognizable feature of 
a deceitful figure lies in its pretence to be something else than what it 
really is or to suppose that a deceiver fabricates reality with his mere 
presence. But these claims seem to imply additionally, that the deceit-
ful figure must already be something by itself. Something with its very 
own identity, which could be so divergent from the object threatened 
by the substitution, that could counterfeit it and thus oust it from its 
entitled place. 
However, the Trickster maneuvers precisely with his immense 
similarity to the original whom he is pretending to be, yet by him-
self he is merely nothing – a vacuous imitator of someone else. The 
fact that something is not as it seems, cannot be spontaneously extended 
into asserting that it therefore must be something else. Namely, because 
there is nothing layered underneath the deceitful, as there is in case of 
a lie – nothing that a deceit could cover up by its own intent and pres-
ence. Hence, to simply conceal the original cannot be the Trickster’s 
essential function. This opens up a completely autonomous field of 
Trickery that inherently differs from a lie. 
A substantially different relation can be observed between the 
trickery and the truth, if compared to the one that stirs between the 
truth and the lie, since the Trickster does not seem to possess the ten-
dency to stand in opposition to the truth, but quite on the contrary, 
attempts to infiltrate it. That is the main motive behind his almost 
flawless imitation of the truth. The Trickster’s imitation of Christ is 
an attempt of substituting him and since it is rather unsuccessful and 
doomed to be so by a certain necessity, the Trickster’s aim rather re-
sults in his accidental duplication of the original instead of an intended 
substitution.  
Appearances can be deceiving – if the trickery as an appearance, 
in its operative deceitful function conceals anything, it conceals only 
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the empty place of the Trickster – his own nullity, if we paraphrase the 
function of the transcendental appearance in Kant’s dialectics. There 
is no conceited form or shadow of an idea (or the truth of you wish). 
But, as Alenka Zupančič explains in one of her articles on Kant, we are 
dealing with an appearance as, I quote “something in place of noth-
ing, [something, which] does not deceive in a way, that it represents 
anything falsely, it deceives with a mere fact, that it exists.“40
Trickster does not place himself on the other side of the truth as 
in opposition but settles directly on a vacant spot of the hidden orig-
inal object. He accumulates within the seemingly unoccupied place, 
which is at the same time the exact place which remains reserved for 
the missing object, the original one. The condition for this self-accu-
mulative act of the Trickster is the structure in which the mechanism 
of trickery prevails, and to which the Trickster is completely subdued. 
He is not an outsider or the creator of his deception but acts as an 
internal and fully engaged agent of it. 
As such the Trickster is characterized by the binary movement 
of deceit: he is tricking another to establish himself as deceiving but 
is at the same time internalized into deception and disabled therein. 
He does not duplicate the original object intentionally, but is hooked 
on the movement of Trickery, which generates and eventually anni-
hilates him through the same process, as trickery always strives for its 
own disclosure to be able to affirm itself as such. As the Trickster is 
existentially bound to it, he consequently shares the same fate. He is 
incorporated into the mechanism of trickery, grows out of it, and gets 
ejected by its disclosure, since he is existentially bound to the precari-
an identity relation with the imitated object.
If we apply Rousseau’s words on «false wisdom» that he con-
ceived in his famous Emile to our problem, we can say that the trick-
ery as such makes a persistent effort to remove Trickster from where 
he is not and brings him to the place where he will never be.41 So, it is a 
transfer him from the vacant to the impossible place, however this is not 
simply the transfer from one place to another, but it is more of an act 
of a revolving on the same spot. 
The Trickster is thus constantly located on the vacant place, which 
is at the same time the place of his own accumulation and the place of 
his bounded persistence – on which he is accumulated as the non-exis-
tent product of nothing. There he strives towards establishing himself 
in the impossible place of the original, since this could enable him to 
rise from nothing to being. However, in this effort, he is unsuccessful.
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The impossible place is impossible for the Trickster to usurp due 
to the resistance of the original which, although being absent, man-
ages to persist from afar and block the imposter, who is constituted 
by two simultaneous acts: the self-accumulation and the self-erasement 
through the act of self-forgetting. This oblivion of his – namely, that he 
forgets the fact that he is an imposter, thus merely the duplication and 
not the original – is the reason for his attempt of usurping the place 
that does not belong to him – he tries to usurp it not as its duplication, 
but as the original itself. 
This similarity between the Trickster and the original that com-
pletely dominates their relationship, leads to confrontation of both 
sides. Deception arises as a battle of similarities which are at the same 
time, in this duality of theirs, marked by difference – thereby, if I para-
phrase Hegel, deception as such has an ontological status of becoming 
that is inherently “self-opposing”42. In the Trickster both moments of 
becoming are present as merged, the coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be but 
only as »vanishing moments«.vii
The negativity of the Trickster who carries out the deception and 
is self-produced through this very act, is in this strict sense, not noth-
ing, but rather falls into this category of self-contradictive duality. In 
deception, when understood as becoming, the two in union are op-
posed to each other in unstable unrest and consequently, sublated in 
itself – coming-to-be as nothing and ceasing-to-be as being. 
However, the result of their sublation is not nothing but equal 
vanishment of both. This moment of the Trickster’s sublation, that is, 
after the Trickster has been revealed and his identity with the original 
fails – does not result in nothing. I quote: »What is sublated does 
not thereby turn into nothing. […] it still has in itself, therefore, the 
determinateness from which it derives« (Ibid.) Thus the Trickster, al-
though sublated, leaves behind a certain trace in the original, which 
survives this confrontation, thus he as an imitator becomes the media-
tor in the original’s self-affirmation. 
The Trickster could thus be thought of as a vanishing mediator. 
One that deceives with his own paradoxicality, since he never exists in 
the full sense of being. With his deceit he transfers the original as his 
vii “…becoming is the vanishing of being into nothing, and of nothing into 
being, and the vanishing of being and nothing in general; but at the same 
time it rests on their being distinct. It therefore contradicts itself in itself, 
because what it unites within itself is self-opposed; but such a union destroys 
itself.”(ibid.)
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exact duplication, but for the reason of his inherent negativity, also 
vanishes simultaneously when the original gets affirmed. As the orig-
inal’s mediator, the Trickster appears to be, in fact, an intermediary 
moment of the original – the one that in his negativity enables original 
emergence and after, when this gets accomplished, sublates himself 
back to nothingness. 
In the biblical narrative, the emergence of the Antichrist reveals 
a certain gap in the nature of God, which although being the Truth 
itself, is nevertheless conditioned by the Antichrist’s deception. For it 
is only through the deceiver as a vanishing mediator who brings the 
end, that Christ as the original is allowed to appear in the world and 
finalize it according to God’s plan. This gives rise to the question if the 
status of the original, as we have presumed by now, is truly originary in 
sense of its apparition being prior to the one of its imitator? 
The answer is no. In the mechanism of trickery, the original ob-
ject is not also the object of an origin – meaning, the object that would 
have been present prior to its own disappearance – since without the 
affirmation through the Trickster’s intervention, the original is not 
even probable. But this does not also mean that the original’s dis-
appearance is not. The original existence is, so to say, an existence 
dwelling only in its imitative, yet completely and inherently empty, 
double. Therefore, the original object does not have its own original 
predecessor that would ever precede the appearance of the Trickster. 
The original object in its original absence does not only anticipate its 
own imitation, but also fully depends on the latter’s intervention and 
cannot exist without imitator’s mediation.
In biblical narrative, mankind anticipates the End as an event 
that is essentially an event of the origin – the end in this sense arises as 
an original event. Trickster emerges as the main representative of the 
End, but also as a figure which in its constitutive moment, forgets its 
own origin in an act of self-forgetting. The Trickster’s original oblivion 
might well be the only original event in this story.
The oblivion implies a complex, but completely synchronous 
structure of the original and the Trickster – the two in their mimetic 
relationship do not only reciprocally legitimize each other’s constitu-
tive moment but are fundamentally included in becoming of another. 
In their confrontation, the two form a split unity, which through their 
interaction gets constantly reactivated and, through an act of forget-
ting, also re-constituted through its inner difference. 
While defending the figure of the Trickster, as something con-
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ceptually autonomous, it is not difficult to notice, that as such, he de-
viates from the biblical framework of the Antichrist from which we 
traced him. With his self-obliviation – his original erasement of himself, 
in the very moment of his own becoming, he simultaneously erases the 
myth of preliminary present origin, of which biblical ontology is so 
fond.
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